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Abstract 
 
Recent efforts have been made to understand how regional differences affect sanitary incentives. 
A substantial body of literature exists that examines the effects of neighborhoods on several 
different and important outcomes. What has been overlooked is whether a neighborhood that a 
restaurant is located in affects the incentives the restaurant has to remain hygienic. The purpose 
of this study was to determine whether restaurants that are homogenous in nature would exhibit 
substantially different hygiene scores based on the underlying consumer learning behaviors 
present in the neighborhoods in which the restaurants are located. This study removed the supply 
side incentives involved with the provision of hygiene to isolate the differences as a product of 
neighborhood variations in consumer learning behaviors. Based on inspection results data from 
all restaurants in the five boroughs of New York City between February 2005 and August 2009, I 
employed OLS and logit regressions as well as hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to test for 
regional variation of restaurant hygiene incentives of like-kind restaurants, without an attempt to 
show causality. The results of OLS, logit, and mixed effects regressions showed statistically 
significant results and indicated that the neighborhood a restaurant is located in affects its 
sanitary incentives. 
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Variation in Restaurant Sanitary Scores in New York City 
 
 It is widely accepted that the presence of poor sanitary conditions in eating 
establishments can contribute negatively to the health of patrons of those establishments. As 
such, the hygiene of restaurants in the United States is highly regulated. One might expect that 
hygiene in varying  “class” of restaurant can be reasonably assumed, but even restaurants that are 
homogenous in nature do not necessarily exhibit uniform sanitary conditions. While variations in 
sanitary conditions between restaurants may exist for a variety of reasons, I posit that hygiene 
scores are influenced by the neighborhoods in which the restaurants are located.  
This study is a response to, and built upon, a thesis by Ginger Zhe Jin and Phillip Leslie 
(Jin & Leslie, 2003; Jin & Leslie, 2009), who posited that consumer-learning capacity varies by 
region and, as such, affects the level of hygiene that is demanded and subsequently provided. 
Their position will be investigated further, later in this paper. The purpose of this study is to 
determine whether the sanitary conditions of like-kind restaurants are affected by the 
neighborhood in which they are located. In addition, the study focused on differences to the 
current discourse and to previous works. It emphasized examining like-kind restaurants and 
focused on specific and tangible geographic barriers as parameters for defining a region. It also 
employed Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) as the cornerstone when interpreting variance.  
I predict that the neighborhood a restaurant is located in plays a role in consumer learning 
as shown by varying demand for hygiene in common eating establishments. In order to pursue 
the hypothesis, I evaluated a cross section of quick service and fast food restaurant hygiene 
scores from 2005 to 2009. This data will serve to shed light on variations outside of presumed 
obvious supply side differentiation.  
!! 5!
Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
Neighborhood Effects on Sanitary Conditions of Restaurants 
 
I reviewed two bodies of literature for this study. The first body was written by Ginger 
Zhe Jin and Phillip Leslie and examines restaurants’ behavior and the incentives they have to 
maintain certain levels of hygiene. It specifically explores the efficacy of prominently displayed 
grade cards on the hygiene of restaurants in Los Angeles County, and the regional variation in 
hygiene provided across restaurant. (Jin & Leslie, 2003; Jin & Leslie, 2009).   
The second body of literature is more substantial and studies the effects of neighborhoods 
on several different and important outcomes. It argues that neighborhoods affect many forms of 
learning (Ellen, Mijanovich, & Dillman, 2001; Garner & Raudenbush, 1991; Pace, Barry, Clapp, 
& Rodriquez, 1998; Zenk et al., 2005). Whether addressing questions of learned dietary habit, 
learned behavioral norms, or outright traditional education learning standards, these authors have 
cited the neighborhood as a determining factor in many contexts.  
!
Literature Review 
 
Food establishments. As Jin and Leslie (2003) note, a useful frame of reference in 
understanding a restaurant’s incentive, or lack thereof, to provide hygiene can be found in 
Akerlof’s (1970) study on the market for “lemons”. Similar to the difficulty consumers face 
when purchasing goods they do not entirely understand; it is equally, if not more, difficult to 
determine the cleanliness of a restaurant.  
Beyond easily perceivable deficiencies, a restaurant’s choice of hygiene that is based on 
profit maximization does not necessarily account for social costs and benefits. For example, a 
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restaurant may decide to keep a lower level of hygiene in order to maximize profits via low 
costs. As a result, the restaurant’s food may sicken its customers, who bear the costs of 
consuming contaminated food. Ensuring highly hygienic conditions may raise both hard and soft 
private costs for the restaurants substantially. Therefore, restaurants may neglect hygiene in order 
to maximize profits, as long as the changes are either not perceived or are deemed unimportant to 
the consumer. 
Jin and Leslie’s (2003) study was the first to discuss the incentives restaurants have to 
maintain hygienic standards. Their study analyzes inspection score data from Los Angeles 
County from July 1995 to December 1998. In an attempt to reduce supply side variance, the 
authors select a sample of restaurants that, while still representative of the data pool in its 
entirety, more accurately allows for the demonstration of changes in the variable of interest. The 
authors look at the effect of mandating restaurants in 1997 (made effective in 1998) to 
prominently display hygiene quality grade cards in their windows.  
Using the law as an exogenous change, they structure a natural experiment using 1996 
and 1997 as the period before the law. They use the change in restaurant inspection grade as their 
outcome of interest. They find that the resulting increase in information symmetry increased 
inspection scores, revenues, and public health. The increase in information available to 
consumers, via prominently displayed hygiene quality grade cards, proved that there are 
quantifiable incentives to providing cleanliness.!
Restaurant reputation. In a subsequent paper, using the same data, Jin and Leslie 
(2009) discuss variations in incentives prior to the issuance of grade cards and the consequential 
increase in incentives across the sample. They contend that restaurants have varying incentives to 
provide hygiene based on consumer learning. To demonstrate their point, Jin and Leslie offer 
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three related hypotheses. Firstly, they posit that franchised units using their chain affiliations 
tend to free-ride on the cleanliness of their company owned counterparts. To demonstrate this, 
the authors used all of the samples from the selected data from their 2003 study; data that was 
obtained before the grade cards were introduced. They then ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression using the hygiene scores to determine the effect of four major variables; whether the 
restaurant belongs to a chain, whether the restaurant is a franchised unit, the number of 
restaurants that belong to the same chain in Los Angeles, and the fraction of US chain units 
located in Los Angeles. They concluded that while chain affiliation significantly increases 
scores, franchisees have significantly lower hygiene scores. The implication is that franchisees 
rely on the positive perception of the brand allowing them to neglect their individual cleanliness 
responsibilities. 
Secondly, they posit that restaurants with repeat business have a greater incentive to leave 
a good impression, and thus are more likely to remediate hygienic issues. Alternatively, 
restaurants with no expectation of, or necessity for, repeat business infer that no consumer 
learning takes place and therefore do not have the same incentive to maintain hygiene. While 
cognizant of the fact that neighborhoods are not easily definable in Los Angeles, the authors 
consider at least two proxies for geographic region or ‘neighborhood’. One proxy is the distance 
that a restaurant is located from the freeway. Since the study was based in Los Angeles, the 
authors conclude that distance to freeway exit is not an adequate measure of repeat customers, 
largely because the freeway covers most of the city. A second proxy, as a substitute for defining 
variation based on geographic region, is the differentiation of ‘tourist regions’. The authors 
utilize employment patterns in fields they believe indicate a lack of repeat business. They first 
test the effect of high incidence of hotel employment and then of high incidence of recreation 
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employment. They follow by investigating proportional presence of chain restaurant locations. 
The authors run an OLS regression on a cross-section of the reporting Los Angeles restaurants, 
in which the dependent variable is pre-grade card hygiene score. The authors predict that each of 
the two employment markers implies low repeat business and therefore that the coefficient 
should be negative. They find, however, that the presence of hotel employees has a positive (and 
significant) effect. The presence of the recreational employees, however, has a negative (and 
significant) effect. The authors further predict that hygiene scores in areas in which at least 15 
percent of restaurants present are chain restaurants should be negatively effected. In such cases, 
however, the coefficient is positive (and significant). The authors find more than mixed results; 
they find significance in the data contradicts their thesis. They therefore conclude that it is 
necessary to include the exogenous change of scorecard introduction in order to demonstrate 
conclusive variation.  
Finally, while this facet of the study goes beyond the premise of relevant critique, the 
authors contend that if learning were the same from region to region, then each region’s 
restaurants would have the same incentive to offer hygiene. The authors contend that once 
hygiene is fully observable, the dependent variable, hygiene scores, would have changed in a 
calculably consistent (affine) way across regions. Their results largely affirm their hypothesis 
that regional learning exists.  
That said,!while they seem to have presented a plausible scenario to affirm differences in 
regional incentives without exogenous change, their results do not show significant differences. 
One potential reason for this is that the choice of the city of interest did not enable them to find 
neighborhood effects. Los Angeles’ disparate and expansive nature makes for a poor backdrop to 
define region and measure neighborhood differentiation. In Los Angeles, a zip code may either 
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contain several neighborhoods or a neighborhood may be comprised of more than a single zip 
code. In addition, the authors made some broad generalizations when defining proxies for 
consumer learning.  I contend that the measures they employed ultimately did not reflect 
consumer learning appropriately. I would argue that using a different city, specifically New 
York, might be more adequate in studying neighborhood effects. New York provides a more 
pedestrian-friendly element that largely removes travel barriers and as a result, it is more 
conceivable that a customer would more readily and regularly patronize a restaurant in a 
different zip code in New York than in Los Angeles. For this reason, New York City may 
provide a more precise picture of consumer learning.  
Another potential inadequacy of the study is the authors’ choice of model; OLS may have 
been insufficient for the task at hand. When analyzing data without the exogenous change, and 
subsequent creation of an unbiased control group, it is difficult to assign a specific subsample as 
the control. As such, a multi-level structure for interpreting the data may be best suited to this 
study. Similarly to how Garner and Raudenbush (1991) examined how students are grouped into 
classrooms and subsequently school districts, restaurants first exist in their immediate 
neighborhood, then in their borough, then in the metropolitan area at large. 
In summation, Jin and Leslie (2009) assert that neighborhoods are a major factor in 
consumer learning behavior. They acknowledge and then demonstrate, however, the difficulty of 
defining those neighborhoods within the context of Los Angeles County. The introduction of the 
exogenous change is therefore necessary for them to demonstrate their point. It is my contention 
that New York City may serve as a superior location to further their point, without that 
exogenous change.  
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Effects of neighborhoods. There are several papers examining the effect of 
neighborhoods on various outcomes other than restaurant patronage. Much of the literature 
across outcomes indicates the neighborhood as a shaping variable. Similar to Jin and Leslie’s 
(2009) employment of grade card implementation, Kling et al. (2005) provide evidence of 
neighborhood effects on crime using the 1992 Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program as an 
experimental design. Their results show that those housing voucher participants who took part in 
the program and relocated to a lower-poverty area reduced their probability of committing 
crimes. These results reinforce the idea that behavior and learning can differ by region. Voucher 
recipients who moved from high poverty to low poverty areas adapted their behavior and 
experienced social learning and were therefore less likely to commit felonies. The authors note 
that the effect of the program varied by gender; relocation reduced crime rates for female youth 
but produced mixed results for male youth. Even with the existence of varying results by gender, 
the study provides evidence that neighborhoods yield different effects on behavior and learning. 
 In the field of Urban Economics, Pace et al. (1998)  provide another demonstration of the 
neighborhood as a contributing factor in the variation of an independent variable.!They use 
‘geocoding’, or spatiotemporal autoregressive models, to show neighborhood effects on housing 
prices. Geocoding allows researchers to accurately pinpoint the distance between a neighborhood 
of interest and a resource and, perhaps more pertinent to urban living, the exact number of 
locations to obtain that resource in a given neighborhood.  The goal of their study is to estimate 
the effect of both spatial and temporal information on real estate prices while confronting the 
issue of having many indicator variables. Housing price data from Fairfax County, Virginia from 
1969 to 1991 was studied with the results showing that the log of sales price of any house is 
strongly affected by the sales prices of previously sold houses in the neighborhood. In fact, the 
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authors explain that in the specific context of Fairfax County, about 80% of the temporal 
difference in log sales prices comes from the nearest fifteen neighbors to a designated house. The 
fact that such a high percentage of the variation in price is attributed to the spatial or proximity 
(neighborhood) effects demonstrates the importance of this variable in comparison to other 
possible contributing factors.!The price of the house depends greatly on the value of the 
neighboring houses. 
 Some critiques of group level analysis assert that outcome effects from grouping are 
instead the result of poorly defined individual-level modeling.  Partly in response to this critique, 
a body of literature has developed in the field of sociology using Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
to examine the effects of the neighborhood. HLM is a method accounting for variations in 
individual level inputs and group level inputs simultaneously. Studies employing this approach, 
which will be described in greater detail shortly, are often used when discussing academic 
achievement (Garner & Raudenbush, 1991), and are able to determine the effects of school and 
district wide phenomena without discounting individual student or household factors that exist.  
 Garner and Raudenbush (1991) utilize data from several sources to look at the effect of 
neighborhoods on academic achievement. They employ HLM to fit several multilevel models. In 
doing so, they use two different types of equations that are estimated simultaneously; within-unit 
and between-unit. The within-unit equation, at the individual level, is an OLS regression that 
places educational outcome as the dependent variable and demographic information as 
independent variables. The between-unit equation focuses on the variances at the neighborhood 
level. 
 The authors explain that employing HLM allows for the explanation of a substantial 
proportion of the variation in educational outcomes. They contend that neighborhood effects can 
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be illustrated in three different ways. Firstly, neighborhoods can affect the development of a 
child’s personality, which affects his or her educational attainment. Secondly, a neighborhood 
can affect the quality and frequency of interactions between children, thus affecting their 
cognitive development. Thirdly, living in a poor neighborhood can result in adverse outcomes 
for the health of a child and may, for example, prevent him or her from attending school. As a 
result, the neighborhood has an important effect on education attainment. This effect is in 
addition to individual and family socioeconomic status. Based on the aforementioned theoretical 
insights, the following hypothesis was developed: 
H1: Restaurants that are homogenous in nature will exhibit substantially different hygiene 
scores based on the underlying consumer learning behaviors present in the neighborhoods in 
which the restaurants are located. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The main data used for this study comes from the New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH). It contains inspection results from all restaurants in the borough 
of Manhattan between February 2, 2005 and August 25, 2009. Restaurants receive anywhere 
from one to greater than five visits annually from the DOHMH. Each visit results in a unique 
score, which is the sum of point values associated with each individual violation of the health 
code. Each violation has a base point value that is then added to depending on the severity of the 
violation. The ideal score for a restaurant is zero. Each additional tally indicates a failure to 
comply with a health code standard. Standards cover many areas from hand washing, evidence of 
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rodents and/or insects, and food temperature controls to legal documentation of fire safety and 
facility design, for example. 
The severity of violations range from Condition Level I to Condition Level V, where 
Condition Level I is the least critical. An example would be violation 11D; a signage violation. 
For this category, only a minor violation exists (Condition Level I). Alternatively, violations 
related to contamination of food pose a public health hazard and are treated as the most severe 
violations. For example, violation 4E – Toxic chemical improperly labeled, stored or used so that 
food contamination may occur – is a violation that may result in a 7 (Condition Level I) to 28 
(Condition Level V) point score added to a restaurant’s tally. For a single incident in any given 
inspection, the restaurant would receive a 7 point score. For two incidences a restaurant would 
receive 8 points. For five incidences in any given inspection a restaurant would receive 28 
points. In the event that a restaurant accumulates more than 28 total points in a single visit, the 
restaurant fails the inspection and will receive a subsequent visit within 30 days. If the restaurant 
does not pass the inspection on this subsequent visit, the inspector has the authority to 
immediately close the establishment. 
In addition to the inspection scores, data was gathered from the United States Decennial 
Census. This study chose to explore nine metrics all at the a zip code level; population, median 
age, median income, percentage of the population that is white, number of families, number of 
housing units, average household size, median rent, and the percent of housing units that are 
owner occupied. 
The main contribution of this study comes from a more precise definition of ‘region’, and 
the exploration of HLM as a tool to further understand variation at the regional level, or group 
effects. As noted earlier, Jin and Leslie (2009) present a compelling argument that regional 
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differences can explain why restaurants may have different hygiene standards. The use of New 
York minimizes the effect of urban sprawl on results and allows use of actual geographic region 
in place of proxies, as were used in Gin and Leslie (2009). The extensive literature on 
neighborhoods (previously reviewed) reinforces the plausibility of neighborhood effects. 
In this study, I analyze neighborhoods as zip code, and, as such, use the two terms 
interchangeably throughout. In order to isolate the effect of the neighborhood, data is limited to 
restaurants geared towards quick service or short order food; the purpose of which, ideally, is to 
eliminate some of the variation stemming from the size or cache of restaurants that may be less 
prevalent in some neighborhoods. Therefore, the difference between two pizza restaurants in two 
different neighborhoods can ideally only be attributed to the intrinsic neighborhood quality in 
which they are located, rather than the echelon and price points of food being offered.  For the 
purposes of this study, incomplete or mislabeled results were dropped and only observations 
from zip codes with at least 10 restaurants were kept.  
The data contains 89,360!unique inspection results from 2005 to 2009 from 19,180 
restaurants across the five boroughs. As seen in Figure 1 and Table 1, the data show scores that 
range from 0 to 252. The scores are significantly skewed right with a skewness over 1.9 and are 
severely peaked with a kurtosis of over 9.8. The mean is approximately 18.4. As would be 
expected with such a skew and range, the sd of score is approximately 16.  The median and mode 
are smaller both at 15. Further, 18.4% percent of inspections resulted in failure. 
The study was restricted to quick service restaurants in an endeavor to remove obvious 
price and reputational variation across star rating of restaurants in various publications (Zagat, 
Michelin, Yelp, etc.) for the purpose of treating restaurants homogenously regardless of their 
location. Plainly, the study is designed to view a pizza restaurant in neighborhood A as largely 
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the same as a pizza restaurant in neighborhood B with the exception of inherent neighborhood 
learning. 
Accounting for that restriction, Figure 2 and Table 2 show that 31,758 scores from 5,245 
restaurants in 168 zip codes are left with a mean score of approximately 17.5 and standard 
deviation of approximately 15.5. The data is again highly skewed right and peaked with a 
skewness of 1.9 and kurtosis of 10. The median and mode remain smaller than the mean but have 
both fallen to 14. The percent of inspections that resulted in failure fell notably to 16.6%. 
Considering that the type of restaurant is restricted to quick service, which are generally 
perceived as ‘less than’, the lower rate of failure is somewhat counter intuitive, but in line with 
Jin and Leslie’s (2009) findings. 
In addition, the study found that more than half of all of these the inspections resulted in a 
score of less than 14, as seen in Figure 3.  Though I did not explore causality directly, I believe 
the low average is due to a restaurants necessity to maintain a standard higher than that of easily 
perceivable cleanliness in order to carry on normal business.  
As discussed earlier in the literature review, there is some concern that group effects 
could simply be misinterpreted individual effects. This study endeavours to  review some of 
those underlying factors using HLM, and, as such, summary information regarding those 
demographic variables is shown on Table 3 for reference. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As a preliminary investigation, the study employed a basic comparative interpretation 
using OLS and logit to compare neighborhood scores and failure rates with a control 
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neighborhood. Simply seeing significant variation from one neighborhood against the control 
could demonstrate the plausibility of neighborhood variation, and subsequently neighborhood 
learning. Table 1 shows the results of OLS and logit regressions. The study used zip code 10009 
in Manhattan as the reference group on both the neighborhood and borough level. The 10009 zip 
code delimits the area in Lower Manhattan between E Houston St and E 20th St, east of 1st 
Avenue. Though subjective, this zip code represents a suitable reference group; it is a firmly 
established, longstanding neighborhood with a diverse population and unremarkable variation in 
land use that includes a considerable mix of commercial, residential, educational and student 
population.  
The OLS regression used the inspection score as the dependent variable and first borough 
dummy variable and used zip code indicators as independent variables. Two of the five boroughs 
showed statistically significant lower (cleaner) scores. The Bronx results were 4.9 points lower at 
the 99% level and the Staten Island results were 3.3 points lower at the 95% level. Also, 34 of 
the 168 neighborhoods (approximately 20%) showed statistically significant variation. 10 
neighborhoods were significant at 90%, 17 at 95%, and 7 at 99%.  
Of the 34 significant coefficients, 30 were negative, and only 4 were positive, meaning 
that 10009 scored higher (or dirtier) than most of the neighborhoods that differed with 
significance. The F score for this regression (where at least one of the zip codes variances is of a 
magnitude greater than 0) is 1.687, which is convincing considering the degrees of freedom. 
In the case of the logit regression, the dependent variable is the probability that a 
restaurant will fail its inspection (scoring higher than 28). The results are consistent with the 
OLS model. It stands to reason that restaurants in neighborhoods with significantly higher or 
lower average scores are, in turn, significantly more or less likely to fail their inspection.  
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Only one of the five boroughs showed a statistically significant lower probability of 
failure. The Bronx was 57.9 % less likely to fail the 90% level. Also, 32 of the 168 
neighborhoods (approximately 19%) showed statistically significant variation. 18 neighborhoods 
were significant at 90%, 12 at 95%, and 2 at 99%. Of the 32 significant variances, 30 were 
negative and only 2 were positive, meaning that 10009 skewed higher in probability of failure 
than most of the neighborhoods that differed with significance. The chi-squared score of this 
regression (that at least one of the zip codes variance is of a greater magnitude than 0) is 183.3, 
which is less convincing than the score regression, but still significant given the degrees of 
freedom. 
One potential issue with these results is that using neighborhood dummy variables 
accounts for all neighborhood differences; both demand and supply side. In order to determine if 
demand side characteristics affect restaurant inspection scores, the study includes neighborhood 
demographic characteristics and aims to discover who or what the demand is comprised of and 
what it looks like. 
In an attempt to rule out this variation, refer to the mean and standard deviation of the 
demographic statistics from Table 3. Table 4(a) shows the mean of each demographic statistic in 
a handful of zip codes that exhibited significant variation both in score and propensity to fail. 
The information includes population estimate, number of families, household units, median age, 
average household size, median income, percentage of residents that are white, and the 
percentage of housing units that are owner occupied. As Table 4(b) shows, individual 
demographic statistics do not vary in magnitude consistently across neighborhoods nor do 
individual neighborhoods vary consistently in magnitude across an individual demographic 
statistics.  
!! 18!
 
One plausible concern with the study involves the variance coming not from an intrinsic 
holistically regional characteristic, but rather from one or two specific underlying characteristics. 
For example, looking only at individual neighborhoods that vary significantly in score, if specific 
demographic statistics consistently showed notable variation when compared to the average 
across all neighborhoods, then it is possible the variance is not coming from the region, but 
instead from that isolated demographic.  
Taking this further, the study explored whether an OLS and logit regression can capture 
the effect of these demographic statistics. Table 5 presents OLS and logit regression results using 
the same demographic variables across all zip codes. As can be seen, five of the nine 
demographic statistics effect the score of an inspection significantly. Population (+), number of 
families (-), percent owner occupancy (-), median age (+), and average household size (+) all 
have the directional effect that one would expect.  Only two statistics effect the probability of 
failure significantly: Population (+), and number of families (-). Both move the probability in the 
expected direction.  
It is reasonable to assume, however, that many of these statistics are highly correlated, 
which likely underrepresents their effects, both when calculated independently and with the 
neighborhood dummies.  This is explored in Table 6. The variables demonstrate relatively high 
co-variations. For example, the correlation coefficient between median income and percentage of 
white population is 0.68. This identifies a strong positive correlation between the two variables. 
The correlation may demonstrate collinearity, which would potentially underestimated individual 
demographic statistics in the regression results.  
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 To further explore this, Table 7 and  present bivariate OLS and logit regression results 
for each demographic statistic run against the dependent variables score and fail, respectively. 
The aim is not to isolate one of these demographic variables as more or less influential than any 
of the others, but is rather to demonstrate that they are statistically significant in their own right. 
In fact, every demographic variable was statistically significant at the 95% level, and all but one 
at the 99% level for both score and fail. For example, for each percentage point increase in the 
population of Caucasian residents, the expected score decreased by .937 points. For each 
additional member in a household, the expected score increased by .46 points. For each 
percentage point increase in owner occupancy, the expected probability of failure decreased by 
34.1%.  
As previously alluded to, scholars tend to employ one of several methods outside of OLS 
to discuss regional variation. The method this study chose to employ was HLM. Within a 
hierarchical structure, while all scores center on a grand mean, subsets of the data can be fixed 
into groups. The data points in these groups, in turn, center on their own group mean without 
losing the grand mean when all individual data points are considered. Sub-dividing the subsets 
again, each subsequent subgroup centers on its own mean as well. This does not minimize the 
importance of the variation evident in first subdivision, however. 
The borough and neighborhood effects were tested first on the grand mean of score and 
the grand mean of failure rate. Table 9(a) shows that the effects are significantly non-zero at both 
the borough and zip levels for both score and fail. For all tables forward, while stars still 
represent significance at the tope level of the regressions, variation at the group levels are 
evaluated by confidence intervals. The significance is determined by an interval that does not 
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include zero. This is presented as such due to statistical tests of significance that the standard 
deviation is equal to zero are not defined. 
 For the HLM regressions, I additionally explore the borough effects not only in 
magnitude, but in direction as well, to see if there is material impact to significance. As such, a 
follow-up regression was conducted on score and probability of failure whereby a dummy 
variable for each borough was an independent variable that affected the score and fail at the 
highest level of the regression. The neighborhood effects were then explored. As can be seen 
from Table 9(b), Brooklyn restaurants demonstrate significantly higher (dirtier) scores at the 
99% level, and Staten Island restaurants demonstrate significantly lower (cleaner) scores at the 
99% level. Brooklyn restaurants also demonstrate a 12.9% higher probability of failure at the 
99% level. Changes at the neighborhood level in both cases are significantly non-zero for both 
score and fail. To illustrate variation further at the zip level, or ‘zipeffects’, please reference 
Figure 5 and Figure 6, which demonstrate the wide array of magnitude and direction by which, 
each individual zip mean varies from the grand mean of the data for both score and fail.  
I separated the zipeffects figures by color-coding them by borough in an attempt to see if 
any easily identifiable patterns emerged visually. It can be seen that Queens appears to house the 
extrema in “Score” and Manhattan seems to house them in “Fail”, but, unfortunately, outside of 
this not much else is discernable. 
One of the benefits of understanding modeling within a hierarchy or a ‘mixed effects’ 
model is that, as with the borough dummy variables used above, many independent variables can 
be tested at any level of the regression in addition to attempting to capture the variation evident 
in the region or sub-region means. In fact, though I do not explore it in this paper, the same 
independent variables can be measured at multiple levels of the regression, making for some 
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very interesting comparison of their effect on different regional or sub regional means versus the 
grand mean. The exploration of these effects at the group level are called variable effect versus 
my exploration of top-level variation, or fixed effects. 
In my next regression I test the fixed effects of the demographic statistics on the score 
and probability of failure, while still considering if neighborhood and borough have an effect.  In 
Table 10(a) one can see that median age increases the score by .11 points and this effect is 
significant at the 95% level. Also, the gross number of families decreases the propensity of 
restaurant failure by almost 27% at the 90% confidence level. Borough and neighborhood 
changes remain significantly non-zero. Similar to the exploration in Table 9(b), when allowing 
for variance in direction of each borough independently, the median age still has a significant 
effect, but now only at the 90% level, and with a slightly lower magnitude of .097. Average 
household size increases the propensity to fail by 17.6% at the 90% level. As seen in Table 
10(b), in this model restaurants in The Bronx are likely to score 1 point lower and are 15% less 
likely to fail, both significant at a 95% level. Restaurants in the Queens are 19% less likely to fail 
at the 99% level. Changes at the neighborhood level, however, remain significantly non-zero.  
As discussed earlier, however, the correlation and interaction of the demographic 
statistics may misrepresent the effect of each variable and subsequently overestimate the effect 
of the region or sub region. To correct for this, I ran bivariate regressions at the highest level of 
the HLM for each individual demographic statistics against the score and failure probability. As 
can be seen in Table 11(a) and Table 12(a), with the exception of median age on score, all 
demographic statistics independently have an effect on the score and the probability of failure; 
most at the 99% level. Taking this into account, however, borough and neighborhood still have a 
significantly non-zero effect for every regression. 
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 As with the previous regressions, in tables 11(b) and 12(b) boroughs were allowed to 
vary directionally and independent of one and other, and the only change was that the effect of 
the number of household units in a neighborhood on the probability of failure lost its 
significance. Otherwise, most demographic statistics still affect their respective dependent 
variables significantly, and borough and neighborhood still have significantly non-zero effect for 
every regression. 
 
 Conclusions and Future Research Direction 
 
 This study examined whether the neighborhood a restaurant is located in affects the 
incentives that the restaurant has to remain hygienic. The methodology used was improved from 
Jin and Leslie (2009), who were the first to suspect that regional differences affect sanitary 
incentives. Rather than using proxy variables to define region, as had been done in previous 
studies, this study used neighborhoods, more precisely zip codes and boroughs to analyze 
restaurants in New York City.  This was done first through an OLS and then through an 
hierarchical lens. The results clearly demonstrate that for homogeneous restaurants, the 
neighborhood in which a restaurant is located effects its hygienic standards.  
 The focus of this study was to establish variation by region in health inspection scores in 
New York City. While the results point to the existence of variation in sanitary incentives by 
region, their determinants, or the underlying causality, remain mostly unknown. While we have 
discussed consumer-learning behavior a number of times in this presentation, it should be noted 
that consumer learning could be the product of a myriad of variables. One could explore 
neighborhood variation in commercial vs residential use, repeat patronage, educational 
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achievement, supply side variation, retail rents, among others. Future research could explore any 
or all of these individual factors that comprise the region’s overall characteristics, and 
subsequently effect the incentives a restaurant has to remain hygienic and whether these 
individual factors or causes vary region to region.  
Additionally, more individual restaurant unit information is needed for comparison 
purposes to improve the literature on this topic (e.g. number of seats, number of restrooms, 
square footage, average check, average unit volume, etc.) When that information becomes 
available, both additional HLM and geocoding could help shed light on this topic.  
This course of study may also benefit from reviewing the data in a strictly residential 
urban environment. While New York offers many advantages to the earlier work done in 
California, the mixed land use and high concentration of a non-residential population in New 
York City may ultimately be problematic; it presents many variables that could cloud census 
demographics as a representation of the underlying intrinsic neighborhood quality, and restaurant 
patronage and propensity to learn. A city with more defined commercial centers and less mixed-
use real estate, such as Chicago or Detroit perhaps, may be better suited for further investigation. 
While many questions remain, this study presents a solid framework with which to investigate 
the inequalities in restaurant hygiene that face some communities. 
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Appendix 
TABLE 1 – Five Borough Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES! mean! sd! skew! k! p50! mode! min! p25! p75! max!
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Score! 18.41! 16.05! 1.92! 9.83! 15! 15! 0! 7! 24! 252!
Fail! 0.184! 0.387! 1.64! 3.67!
! ! ! ! ! !No.!of!Inspections! 89,360!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !No.!of!Restaurants! 19,180!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !No.!of!Zips!Codes! 178!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !No.!of!Boroughs! 5!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
!
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TABLE 2 – Restricted Type Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES! mean! sd! skew! k! p50! mode! min! p25! p75! max!
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Score! 17.47! 15.47! 1.932! 9.996! 14! 14! 0! 7! 23! 248!
Fail! 0.166! 0.372! 1.796! 4.227! 0! 0! 0! 0! 0! 1!
No.!of!Inspections! 31,758!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !No.!of!Restaurants! 5,245!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !No.!of!Zips!Codes! 168!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !No.!of!Boroughs! 5! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
!
!!
!
28!
 T
A
B
L
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 3 – D
em
ographic Statistic D
istribution 
        
      
VARIABLES!
m
ean!
sd!
skew
ness!
kurtosis!
p50!
m
ode!
m
in!
p25!
p75!
m
ax!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
Population!
!46,912!!
!25,723!!
!0.32!!
!2.27!!
!41,936!!
!41,936!!
!229!!
!27,427!!
!65,154!!
!106,154!!
N
o.!of!Fam
ilies!
!10,859!!
!6,170!!
!0.38!!
!2.28!!
!9,943!!
!9,943!!
!10!!
!6,000!!
!15,736!!
!25,450!!
N
o.!of!Housing!U
nits!
!17,734!!
!10,002!!
!0.69!!
!4.10!!
!16,074!!
!16,074!!
!13!!
!9,866!!
!25,389!!
!61,774!!
M
edian!Age!
!34.7!!
!4.3!!
N0.02!!
!3.22!!
!34.5!!
!34.5!!
!20.3!!
!32.2!!
!37.7!!
!46.5!!
Avg!Household!Size!
!2.61!!
!0.50!!
N0.55!!
!2.64!!
!2.69!!
!2.69!!
!1.47!!
!2.32!!
!2.97!!
!3.66!!
M
edian!Rent!
!790!!
!278!!
!2.37!!
!10.59!!
!753!!
!753!!
!299!!
!644!!
!827!!
!2,001!!
M
edian!Incom
e!
!43,291!!
!18,162!!
!0.98!!
!4.49!!
!40,928!!
!40,928!!
!14,271!!
!29,488!!
!54,688!!
!112,947!!
Percent!W
hite!
!0.48!!
!0.28!!
N0.10!!
!1.73!!
!0.52!!
!0.52!!
!0.02!!
!0.25!!
!0.73!!
!0.95!!
Percent!O
w
ner!O
cc.!
!0.34!!
!0.22!!
!0.54!!
!2.28!!
!0.29!!
!0.29!!
!0.01!!
!0.17!!
!0.50!!
!0.90!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!
!
!
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TABLE 4(a) – Mean Of Demographic Statistics Of Significantly Variable Zip Codes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4(b) – Mean Of Demographic Statistics Of Significantly Variable Zip Cod 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES! 10004! 10040! 10455! 10456! 11369! 11430! 10303! 11004! 11361!
Population! 1,225! 46,599! 37,465! 76,656! 36,110! 229! 23,530! 14,682! 29,206!
No.!of!Families! 209! 10,643! 8,562! 17,749! 8,284! 10! 5,683! 3,822! 7,427!
No.!of!Housing!Units! 622! 16,180! 11,966! 25,169! 11,072! 13! 7,388! 5,708! 11,084!
Median!Age! 34.4! 32.9! 28.1! 27.6! 33.3! 20.3! 29.9! 40.5! 38.3!
Avg!Household!Size! 1.79! 2.82! 3.01! 2.98! 3.21! 2.92! 3.15! 2.53! 2.59!
Median!Rent! 2,001! 647! 460! 489! 809! 1,125! 636! 758! 919!
Median!Income! 101,868! 27,905! 19,389! 16,664! 39,936! 85,197! 42,463! 55,156! 55,250!
Percent!White! 0.74! 0.31! 0.23! 0.14! 0.29! 0.22! 0.42! 0.61! 0.66!
Percent!Owner!Occ.! 0.21! 0.07! 0.07! 0.07! 0.53! 0.46! 0.54! 0.67! 0.55!
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
!
VARIABLES! 10004! 10040! 10455! 10456! 11369! 11430! 10303! 11004! 11361!
Population! 1.776! 0.012! 0.367! 1.156! 0.420! 1.815! 0.909! 1.253! 0.688!
No.!of!Families! 1.726! 0.035! 0.372! 1.117! 0.417! 1.758! 0.839! 1.141! 0.556!
No.!of!Housing!Units! 1.711! 0.155! 0.577! 0.743! 0.666! 1.772! 1.034! 1.202! 0.665!
Median!Age! 0.058! 0.403! 1.509! 1.625! 0.311! 3.307! 1.095! 1.348! 0.841!
Avg!Household!Size! 1.648! 0.423! 0.805! 0.744! 1.207! 0.624! 1.086! 0.160! 0.040!
Median!Rent! 4.348! 0.515! 1.187! 1.083! 0.067! 1.202! 0.555! 0.116! 0.462!
Median!Income! 3.225! 0.847! 1.316! 1.466! 0.185! 2.307! 0.046! 0.653! 0.658!
Percent!White! 0.924! 0.604! 0.910! 1.228! 0.701! 0.951! 0.218! 0.451! 0.631!
Percent!Owner!Occ.! 0.578! 1.217! 1.247! 1.260! 0.864! 0.559! 0.929! 1.525! 0.956!
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
!
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TABLE 5 – Regression Of All Demographic Statistics On Score And Fail 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES! Score! Fail!
!! !! !!
Population! 0.696**! 0.0850*!
!
(0.280)! (0.0481)!
No.!of!Families! U2.019**! U0.262*!
!
(0.812)! (0.141)!
No.!of!Housing!Units! U0.231! U0.0232!
!
(0.365)! (0.0637)!
Median!Age! 0.118***! 0.00946!
!
(0.0409)! (0.00713)!
Avg.!Household!Size! 0.834*! 0.0483!
!
(0.487)! (0.0848)!
Median!Rent! 0.0958! U0.00111!
!
(0.112)! (0.0200)!
Median!Income! U0.190! U0.0345!
!
(0.219)! (0.0391)!
Percent!White! 0.108! 0.0358!
!
(0.542)! (0.0942)!
Percent!Owner!Occ.! U2.189*! U0.196!
!
(1.210)! (0.213)!
Constant! 11.12***! U1.961***!
!
(2.194)! (0.382)!
! ! !Observations! 31,758!
!RUsquared! 0.002!
!!! !! !!
Standard!errors!in!parentheses!
***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!*!p<0.1!
!
!!
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VARIABLES!
Percent!
W
hite!
Population!
N
o.!of!
Fam
ilies!
N
o.!House!
U
nits!
Percent!
O
w
ner!O
cc.!
M
edian!Age!
Avg!House!
Size!
M
edian!
Rent!
M
edian!
Incom
e!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Percent!W
hite!
1!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Population!
I0.22!
1!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
N
o.!of!Fam
ilies!
I0.27!
0.97!
1!
!
!
!
!
!
!
N
o.!of!Housing!U
nits!
0.12!
0.86!
0.76!
1!
!
!
!
!
!
Percent!O
w
ner!O
cc.!
0.3!
I0.12!
I0.02!
I0.11!
1!
!
!
!
!
M
edian!Age!
0.64!
I0.21!
I0.19!
0.09!
0.47!
1!
!
!
!
Avg!Household!Size!
I0.65!
0.41!
0.52!
I0.05!
0.13!
I0.57!
1!
!
!
M
edian!Rent!
0.61!
I0.31!
I0.38!
0.01!
0.19!
0.42!
I0.65!
1!
!
M
edian!Incom
e!
0.68!
I0.33!
I0.38!
0.02!
0.44!
0.55!
I0.64!
0.92!
1!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!
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VARIABLES!
Population!
N
o.!of!
Fam
ilies!
N
o.!House!
U
nits!
M
edian!
Age!
Avg!House!
Size!
M
edian!
Rent!
M
edian!
Incom
e!
Percent!
W
hite!
Percent!
O
w
ner!O
cc.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Dem
ographic!Stat!
0.193***!
0.709***!
0.365***!
I0.0458**!
0.460***!
I0.104***!
I0.216***!
I0.937***!
I2.024***!
!
(0.0324)!
(0.131)!
(0.0807)!
(0.0214)!
(0.151)!
(0.0323)!
(0.0486)!
(0.336)!
(0.514)!
Constant!
16.45***!
16.64***!
16.69***!
19.06***!
16.35***!
18.33***!
18.42***!
17.97***!
18.05***!
!
(0.193)!
(0.178)!
(0.193)!
(0.748)!
(0.378)!
(0.278)!
(0.230)!
(0.197)!
(0.169)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
O
bservations!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
RIsquared!
0.001!
0.001!
0.001!
0.000!
0.000!
0.000!
0.001!
0.000!
0.000!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
Standard!errors!in!parentheses!
***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!*!p<0.1!
!
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VARIABLES!
Population!
N
o.!of!
Fam
ilies!
N
o.!House!
U
nits!
M
edian!Age!
Avg!House!
Size!
M
edian!
Rent!
M
edian!
Incom
e!
Percent!
W
hite!
Percent!
O
w
ner!O
cc.!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
Dem
ographic!Stat!
0.0236***!
0.0863***!
0.0395***!
I0.00979***!
0.0707***!
I0.0245***!
I0.170***!
I0.0428***!
I0.341***!
!
(0.00563)!
(0.0227)!
(0.0139)!
(0.00372)!
(0.0263)!
(0.00583)!
(0.0582)!
(0.00864)!
(0.0911)!
Constant!
I1.742***!
I1.718***!
I1.700***!
I1.276***!
I1.788***!
I1.416***!
I1.526***!
I1.429***!
I1.520***!
!
(0.0341)!
(0.0313)!
(0.0337)!
(0.130)!
(0.0664)!
(0.0494)!
(0.0337)!
(0.0400)!
(0.0293)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
O
bservations!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
31,758!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
Standard!errors!in!parentheses!
***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!*!p<0.1!
!
!
!
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TABLE 9(a) – HLM Regression On Score And Fail Grand Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!! Score! Fail!
! ! !
Mean! 17.23***! 41.632***!
!
[16.57,17.90]! [41.708,41.557]!
! ! !
sd(Boro)! 0.692! 0.0735!
!
[0.317,1.509]! [0.0323,0.167]!
sd(Zip)! 0.938! 0.0877!
!! [0.711,1.238]! [0.0479,0.161]!
! ! !Observations! !31,758!! !31,758!!
No.!of!Boroughs! !5!! !5!!
! ! !
95%!confidence!intervals!in!brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!
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TABLE 9(b) – HLM Regression On Score And Fail Allowing Borough Variation Showing 
Remaining Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!! Score! Fail!
! ! !
Bronx! 40.588! 40.0285!
!
[41.331,0.155]! [40.137,0.0799]!
Brooklyn! 1.077***! 0.129***!
!
[0.443,1.712]! [0.0406,0.217]!
Queens! 40.12! 40.0871*!
!
[40.737,0.496]! [40.177,0.00327]!
Staten!Island! 41.381***! 40.119!
!
[42.431,40.332]! [40.282,0.0449]!
Constant! 17.37***! 41.620***!
!
[16.94,17.79]! [41.678,41.562]!
! ! !
sd(Zip)! 0.903! 0.0839!
!! [0.680,1.199]! [0.0444,0.159]!
! ! !Observations! !31,758!! !31,758!!
No.!of!Zips! !168!! !168!!
! ! !
95%!confidence!intervals!in!brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!
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TABLE 10(a) – HLM Regression With All Demographic Statistics On Score And Fail Included 
At the Top Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES! Score! Fail!
!! !! !!
Population! 0.524! 0.069!
!
[40.230,1.277]! [40.0324,0.170]!
No.!of!Families! 41.67! 40.267*!
!
[43.917,0.576]! [40.574,0.0408]!
No.!of!Housing!Units! 40.0764! 0.0045!
!
[41.051,0.898]! [40.125,0.134]!
Median!Age! 0.110**! 0.0126!
!
[0.00181,0.219]! [40.00292,0.0281]!
Avg!Household!Size! 0.888! 0.142!
!
[40.411,2.186]! [40.0424,0.326]!
Median!Rent! 0.0662! 0.00538!
!
[40.211,0.343]! [40.0355,0.0463]!
Median!Income! 40.166! 40.0418!
!
[40.702,0.370]! [40.121,0.0372]!
Percent!White! 40.0252! 0.0225!
!
[41.336,1.285]! [40.170,0.215]!
Percent!Owner!Occ.! 42.199! 40.158!
!
[45.264,0.866]! [40.599,0.283]!
! ! !sd(Boro)! 0.471! 0.0674!
!
[0.200,1.106]! [0.0287,0.158]!
sd(Zip)! 0.738! 0.0269!
!! [0.509,1.068]! [0.000258,2.808]!
! ! !Observations! !31,758!! !31,758!!
No.!of!Boroughs! !5!! !5!!
! ! !95%!confidence!intervals!in!brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!
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TABLE 10(b) – HLM Regression With All Demographic Statistics On Score And Fail 
Included At the Top Level Allowing Borough Variation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES! Score! Fail!
! ! !Population! 0.428! 0.0584!
!
[40.325,1.182]! [40.0434,0.160]!
No.!of!Families! 41.386! 40.243!
!
[43.686,0.914]! [40.560,0.0749]!
No.!of!Housing!Units! 40.0253! 0.0134!
!
[40.985,0.934]! [40.114,0.141]!
Median!Age! 0.097*! 0.0122!
!
[40.0157,0.210]! [40.00404,0.0284]!
Avg!Household!Size! 0.964! 0.176*!
!
[40.334,2.261]! [40.00363,0.355]!
Median!Rent! 0.0407! 0.00632!
!
[40.239,0.320]! [40.0351,0.0477]!
Median!Income! 40.14! 40.0443!
!
[40.673,0.394]! [40.123,0.0346]!
Percent!White! 0.0974! 0.0344!
!
[41.267,1.461]! [40.166,0.235]!
Percent!Owner!Occ.! 42.036! 40.108!
!
[45.176,1.104]! [40.561,0.346]!
Bronx! 41.038**! 40.153**!
!
[42.002,40.0745]! [40.292,40.0142]!
Brooklyn! 0.569! 0.00691!
!
[40.324,1.461]! [40.118,0.132]!
Queens! 40.303! 40.190***!
!
[41.232,0.627]! [40.323,40.0562]!
Staten!Island! 40.843! 40.127!
!
[42.429,0.743]! [40.368,0.113]!
! ! !sd(Zip)! 0.701! 0.0107!
!! [0.476,1.032]! [1.15e414,9.90260e+09]!
! ! !Observations! !31,758!! !31,758!!
No.!of!Zips! !168!! !168!!
! ! !95%!confidence!intervals!in brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!
!!
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LM
 B
ivariate R
egression O
f Each D
em
ographic Statistics O
n Score Included A
t the Top Level 
   
 
VARIABLES!
Population!
N
o.!of!
Fam
ilies!
N
o.!House!
U
nits!
M
edian!Age!
Avg!House!
Size!
M
edian!Rent!
M
edian!
Incom
e!
Percent!W
hite!
Percent!
O
w
ner!O
cc.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Dem
ographic!Stat!
0.177***!
0.702***!
0.325***!
P0.0362!
0.742**!
P0.136***!
P0.256***!
P0.891*!
P2.313***!
!
[0.0840,0.270]!
[0.304,1.101]!
[0.0924,0.558]!
[P0.0963,0.0239]!
[0.156,1.328]!
[P0.234,P0.0374]!
[P0.401,P0.112]!
[P1.837,0.0539]!
[P3.812,P0.814]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
sd(Boro)!
0.56!
0.605!
0.584!
0.687!
0.786!
0.724!
0.651!
0.654!
0.587!
!
[0.238,1.316]!
[0.264,1.382]!
[0.252,1.354]!
[0.315,1.495]!
[0.369,1.675]!
[0.336,1.560]!
[0.301,1.410]!
[0.300,1.423]!
[0.273,1.266]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
sd(Zip)!
0.854!
0.866!
0.902!
0.924!
0.873!
0.893!
0.866!
0.915!
0.872!
!!
[0.628,1.163]!
[0.639,1.172]!
[0.675,1.204]!
[0.696,1.227]!
[0.643,1.184]!
[0.670,1.190]!
[0.645,1.164]!
[0.688,1.218]!
[0.645,1.178]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
O
bservations!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
N
o.!of!Boroughs!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
95%
!confidence!intervals!in!brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!
!!
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T
A
B
L
E
 11(b) – H
LM
 B
ivariate R
egression O
f Each D
em
ographic Statistics O
n Score Included A
t the Top Level A
llow
ing B
orough 
V
ariation 
 
VARIABLES!
Population!
N
o.!of!
Fam
ilies!
N
o.!House!
U
nits!
M
edian!Age!
Avg!House!
Size!
M
edian!Rent!
M
edian!
Incom
e!
Percent!W
hite!
Percent!
O
w
ner!O
cc.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Dem
ographic!Stat!
0.167***!
0.679***!
0.293**!
P0.0358!
0.836***!
P0.141***!
P0.255***!
P0.831*!
P2.253***!
!
[0.0740,0.260]!
[0.280,1.078]!
[0.0624,0.524]!
[P0.0957,0.0242]!
[0.238,1.434]!
[P0.239,P0.0424]!
[P0.401,P0.109]!
[P1.785,0.122]!
[P3.863,P0.643]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Bronx!
P0.866**!
P0.994**!
P0.575!
P0.749*!
P1.285***!
P1.114***!
P1.225**!
P0.829**!
P0.612*!
!
[P1.597,P0.135]!
[P1.750,P0.237]!
[P1.304,0.155]!
[P1.535,0.0376]!
[P2.162,P0.408]!
[P1.930,P0.297]!
[P2.033,P0.417]!
[P1.615,P0.0428]!
[P1.333,0.109]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Brooklyn!
0.617*!
0.506!
0.961***!
0.983***!
0.42!
0.651*!
0.586!
0.940***!
1.222***!
!
[P0.0408,1.275]!
[P0.190,1.202]!
[0.332,1.589]!
[0.334,1.632]!
[P0.351,1.191]!
[P0.0361,1.339]!
[P0.0872,1.259]!
[0.293,1.586]!
[0.600,1.844]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Q
ueens!
P0.206!
P0.337!
0.0128!
P0.138!
P0.847**!
P0.382!
P0.356!
P0.236!
0.377!
!
[P0.801,0.388]!
[P0.947,0.273]!
[P0.600,0.626]!
[P0.752,0.475]!
[P1.645,P0.0493]!
[P1.015,0.251]!
[P0.969,0.257]!
[P0.861,0.389]!
[P0.314,1.067]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Staten!Island!
P1.378***!
P1.571***!
P1.197**!
P1.396***!
P2.100***!
P1.722***!
P1.383**!
P1.260**!
P0.421!
!
[P2.393,P0.362]!
[P2.598,P0.545]!
[P2.241,P0.154]!
[P2.440,P0.352]!
[P3.247,P0.954]!
[P2.782,P0.662]!
[P2.405,P0.361]!
[P2.309,P0.210]!
[P1.651,0.810]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
sd(Zip)!
0.815!
0.827!
0.863!
0.888!
0.833!
0.859!
0.832!
0.88!
0.837!
!!
[0.592,1.122]!
[0.604,1.131]!
[0.641,1.163]!
[0.664,1.188]!
[0.608,1.143]!
[0.640,1.152]!
[0.614,1.126]!
[0.656,1.179]!
[0.614,1.141]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
O
bservations!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
N
o.!of!Zips!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
95%
!confidence!intervals!in!brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!!
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T
A
B
L
E
 12(a) – H
LM
 B
ivariate Logit R
egression O
f Each D
em
ographic Statistics O
n Fail Included A
t the Top Level  
 
   
VARIABLES!
Population!
N
o.!of!
Fam
ilies!
N
o.!House!
U
nits!
M
edian!Age!
Avg!House!
Size!
M
edian!Rent!
M
edian!
Incom
e!
Percent!
W
hite!
Percent!
O
w
ner!O
cc.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Dem
ographic!
Stat!
0.0216***!
0.0849***!
0.031*!
P0.00883**!
0.156***!
P0.0295***!
P0.0489***!
P0.186***!
P0.339***!
!
[0.00811,0.03]!
[0.0283,0.141
]!
[P0.0027,0.0646]!
[P0.0175,P
0.000172]!
[0.0726,0.239
]!
[P0.0438,P
0.0153]!
[P0.0695,P
0.0283]!
[P0.320,P
0.0508]!
[P0.556,P
0.121]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
sd(Boro)!
0.0572!
0.0619!
0.0630!
0.0694!
0.101!
0.0767!
0.0696!
0.0714!
0.0602!
!
[0.0226,0.145]!
[0.0254,0.151
]!
[0.0257,0.154]!
[0.0301,0.160]!
[0.0475,0.216
]!
[0.0341,0.173]!
[0.0310,0.156]!
[0.0322,0.15
9]!
[0.0257,0.141]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
sd(Zip)!
0.0767!
0.0780!
0.0863!
0.0804!
0.0572!
0.0701!
0.0630!
0.0753!
0.0742!
!!
[0.0361,0.163]!
[0.0376,0.162
]!
[0.0462,0.161]!
[0.0403,0.160]!
[0.0173,0.189
]!
[0.0316,0.155]!
[0.0248,0.160]!
[0.0352,0.16
1]!
[0.0340,0.162]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
O
bservations!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
N
o.!of!
Boroughs!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!5!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
95%
!confidence!intervals!in!brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!!
41!
T
A
B
L
E
 12(b) – H
LM
 B
ivariate Logit R
egression O
f Each D
em
ographic Statistics O
n Fail Included A
t the Top Level A
llow
ing 
B
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VARIABLES!
Population!
N
o.!of!Fam
ilies!
N
o.!H
ouse!U
nits!
M
edian!Age!
Avg!House!Size!
M
edian!Rent!
M
edian!Incom
e!
Percent!W
hite!
Percent!O
w
ner!
O
cc.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
D
em
ographic!
Stat!
0.0197***!
0.0807***!
0.0251!
P0.00853*!
0.176***!
P0.0307***!
P0.0501***!
P0.187***!
P0.340***!
!
[0.00625,0.0331]!
[0.0231,0.138]!
[P0.00768,0.0579]!
[P0.0173,0.000252]!
[0.0936,0.258]!
[P0.0452,P0.0162]!
[P0.0713,P0.0289]!
[P0.325,P0.0484]!
[P0.584,P0.0962]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Bronx!
P0.0632!
P0.0795!
P0.0271!
P0.07!
P0.184***!
P0.142**!
P0.155***!
P0.087!
P0.0365!
!
[P0.171,0.0450]!
[P0.192,0.0325]!
[P0.135,0.0808]!
[P0.185,0.0450]!
[P0.309,P0.0589]!
[P0.259,P0.0252]!
[P0.271,P0.0395]!
[P0.201,0.0270]!
[P0.142,0.0686]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Brooklyn!
0.0742!
0.0597!
0.120***!
0.104**!
P0.0168!
0.0379!
0.034!
0.0952**!
0.149***!
!
[P0.0186,0.167]!
[P0.0388,0.158]!
[0.0314,0.208]!
[0.0142,0.194]!
[P0.123,0.0889]!
[P0.0557,0.132]!
[P0.0573,0.125]!
[0.00666,0.184]!
[0.0632,0.235]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Q
ueens!
P0.103**!
P0.119**!
P0.077*!
P0.0945**!
P0.248***!
P0.144***!
P0.137***!
P0.116**!
P0.021!
!
[P0.191,P0.0141]!
[P0.210,P0.0276]!
[P0.168,0.0137]!
[P0.183,P0.00542]!
[P0.362,P0.134]!
[P0.235,P0.0528]!
[P0.225,P0.0489]!
[P0.206,P0.0256]!
[P0.119,0.0771]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Staten!Island!
P0.12!
P0.144*!
P0.103!
P0.122!
P0.274***!
P0.189**!
P0.116!
P0.0932!
0.0262!
!
[P0.280,0.0408]!
[P0.307,0.0176]!
[P0.267,0.0614]!
[P0.284,0.0394]!
[P0.447,P0.101]!
[P0.352,P0.0267]!
[P0.274,0.0414]!
[P0.254,0.0680]!
[P0.164,0.216]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
sd(Zip)!
0.0715!
0.0729!
0.0815!
0.0763!
0.0499!
0.0662!
0.0584!
0.0708!
0.0685!
!!
[0.0313,0.164]!
[0.0328,0.162]!
[0.0417,0.159]!
[0.0365,0.160]!
[0.0113,0.220]!
[0.0282,0.156]!
[0.0207,0.164]!
[0.0310,0.162]!
[0.0286,0.164]!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
O
bservations!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
!31,758!!
N
o.!of!Zips!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!168!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
95%
!confidence!intervals!in!brackets!
*!p<0.10,!**!p<0.05,!***!p<0.01!
!
!
!
! 42!
 
FIGURE 1 –   
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FIGURE 2 –   
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FIGURE 3 –   
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FIGURE 5 –   
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FIGURE 6 –   
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